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For decades, constitutional doctrine has held that the Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of speech applies equally to laws adopted by
the federal, state, and local governments. Nevertheless, the identity
of the government actor behind a law may be a significant, if un-
recognized, factor in free speech cases. This Article reports the
results of a comprehensive study of core free speech cases decided
by the federal courts over a 14-year period. The study finds that
speech-restrictive laws adopted by the federal government are far
more likely to be upheld than similar laws adopted by state and lo-
cal governments. Courts applying strict scrutiny in free speech
cases upheld federal speech laws in 56% of cases, state speech laws
in 24% of cases, and local speech laws in a remarkably low 3% of
cases. It turns out that one of the best predictors of whether a law
impinging on speech rights will be upheld is the identity of the gov-
ernmental actor who adopts the law. The reasons for this 'free
speech federalism" and the implications of this phenomenon for
constitutional adjudication are explored.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TROD U CTION ...................................................................................... 154
I. FREE SPEECH TAILORING IN HISTORY AND THEORY ................ 156
A. First Amendment Incorporation and Its Discontents ......... 156
B . W hy Federalism ? ............................................................... 157
II. FREE SPEECH TAILORING IN PRACTICE .................................... 163
A. The Case Law: An Overview ............................................. 163
B. The Case Law: A M odel .................................................... 169
C. The Case Law: A Granular Examination .......................... 171
1. Right-of-Access Cases ................................................. 171
2. Campaign-Speech Cases ............................................. 174
3. Indecency Cases .......................................................... 177
4. Miscellaneous Speech Cases ....................................... 178
5. Public-Forum-Access Cases ........................................ 179
III. IM PLICATION S ........................................................................... 181
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Terrific substantive suggestions were provided
by Devon Carbado, Joe Doherty, Noah Zatz, Rick Sander, Jon Varat, Jennifer Mnookin, Stephen
Gardbaum, Kent Greenfield, Ken Karst, Ron Collins, Robert Goldstein, Ernie Young, Eugene Vo-
lokh, and the participants at conferences and workshops at UCLA, Northwestern, Boston College,
Pepperdine, the University of Pennsylvania, and the First Amendment Center. Greg Martin provided
fine research assistance.
Michigan Law Review
A. The Dangers of Devolution ................................................ 181
B . Tailoring R ights ................................................................. 184
C ONCLU SIO N .......................................................................................... 187
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court first held that the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech was incorporated to apply to the states, the Court
has maintained that there is no formal distinction between laws burdening
speech adopted at the federal, state, or local level. Regardless of their place
in the federal system, all levels of government are formally treated to the
same standards of review in speech doctrine.1 A content-based speech re-
striction, such as a campaign-finance law or a measure restricting indecent
speech, is adjudicated under strict scrutiny regardless of whether it was
enacted at the federal, state, or local level.2 A content-neutral speech restric-
tion, such as a limitation on the time, place, or manner of speech, is
adjudicated under a form of intermediate scrutiny no matter the governmen-
tal source.3 According to Fred Schauer, First Amendment doctrine is thus
marked by "institutional blindness,' 4 with "the government" usually envi-
sioned as a single, monolithic entity.5
The identity of the governmental institution behind a law restricting free
speech rights may nonetheless be a significant, if hidden, factor in free
speech cases. In this Article, I report the results of an empirical study of free
speech decisions in the federal courts and reveal the ways in which the level
of government behind a speech law-federal, state, or local-affects the
degree of constitutional protection. This study shows that speech restrictions
1. See William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV.
107, 143 (1982) ("Since 1925, it has been assumed ... that the fourteenth amendment pulls up the
first amendment's speech clause into its own provisions. Indeed ... the standard of judicial review
for state or local laws affecting speech is coextensive with the standard applicable to acts of Con-
gress.").
2. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (applying
strict scrutiny to a federal content-based speech restriction); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to a state content-based speech law).
3. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) ("We are also
guided by the fact that Renton requires that municipal ordinances receive only intermediate scrutiny
if they are content neutral." (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-50 (1986)).
Intermediate scrutiny is also proper for federal content-neutral laws. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 180 (1997) ("[T]his Court held these so-called 'must-carry' provisions to
be subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny ... whereby a content-neutral regulation will
be sustained if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free
speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.").
4. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256,
1259-64 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Institutional First Amendment] (citing examples of the Court's
unwillingness to "draw lines among institutions or speakers" when crafting First Amendment speech
doctrine).
5. Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1328, 1328-30 (1994) (citing the tendency of scholars and
judges to view local, state, and national governments as a single institution referred to as "the gov-
ernment," rather than as the distinct institutions the Framers intended).
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adopted by the federal government are far more likely to be upheld than
speech restrictions adopted by other levels of government. Between 1990
and 2003, federal speech restrictions were upheld in 56% of federal court
rulings, while only 24% of state speech restrictions were upheld. Even more
striking is the fate of speech restrictions adopted by local governments;
these were invalidated in almost every case, with only 3% surviving judicial
review. In short, the level of government is a very good predictor of whether
a speech restriction is likely to be upheld by the federal courts. This Article
details these findings and considers potential explanations for, and implica-
tions of, this "free speech federalism."
Part I provides a bit of historical background on the incorporation of the
First Amendment and early arguments for distinct judicial treatment of fed-
eral and state speech laws. Part I then proposes two reasons why the level of
government behind a speech burden might matter despite formally equal
doctrinal standards: (1) deference by the federal courts to federal laws and
(2) variation in the constitutional quality of lawmaking at the different levels
of government.
Part II reports the results of a comprehensive census of published federal
court decisions adjudicating restrictions on core free speech rights issued
between 1990 and 2003. The cases show that federal speech restrictions fare
much better in federal court than do state and local speech restrictions. This
Part then estimates a model for predicting the likelihood that a speech law
will survive federal judicial review. Even if we control for differences in the
types of speech laws adopted by the different levels of government, federal
laws are still far more likely than state and local speech restrictions to be
upheld. This Part concludes with a closer examination of each doctrinal
subgroup of free speech cases in which there are overlapping federal, state,
or local restrictions. This examination uncovers deference to the federal
government by the courts in some cases and poor lawmaking by the lower
levels of government in others.
Finally, Part III considers a few implications of the federalism effect in
free speech law. As part of the larger movement advocating decentralization
in the field of constitutional law, some have advocated giving more authority
to state and local governments to burden even fundamental individual rights.
To the extent state and local laws fail due to poor quality, the free speech
cases suggest that these governments may not be trustworthy when it comes
to individual rights. A second implication is tied to the emerging literature
on rights "tailoring"-that is, the practice of permitting some governmental
actors, such as prisons or public schools, more leeway to regulate in ways
that burden rights. The free speech cases suggest that tailoring occurs in
ways that doctrine has not recognized. The cases also call into question the
underlying rationale courts have offered for applying constitutional provi-
sions differently to distinct government entities.
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I. FREE SPEECH TAILORING IN HISTORY AND THEORY
A. First Amendment Incorporation and Its Discontents
By its terms, the First Amendment is a limitation only on the federal
government: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech .... 6 For the first 130 years of its existence, the amendment re-
mained applicable only to federal laws. In a series of cases decided in the
1920s and 1930s, however, the Supreme Court read the Constitution to ex-
tend the principles of free speech to state and local governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment!
During the early years of First Amendment incorporation, the Court
flirted with the idea of treating federal speech restrictions differently than
state and local speech restrictions. "[P]erhaps," Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote in a 1925 case, the Fourteenth Amendment afforded the states
"a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by
the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the Unit-
ed States" under the First Amendment.8
Holmes did not elaborate on this idea, but later Justices did. Justice Ro-
bert Jackson argued that "the powers of Congress and of the States over
[libelous speech] are not of the same dimensions, and that because Congress
probably could not enact this law it does not follow that the States may
not."9 The second Justice John Marshall Harlan echoed this view in a series
of obscenity decisions in the 1950s and 1960s.' ° According to Harlan, "Con-
gress has no substantive power over sexual morality,"" a matter "primarily
entrusted to the care, not of the Federal Government, but of the States."'
2
The Court, he wrote, "should keep in the forefront the question of whether
those [government] interests are state or federal. Since under our constitu-
tional scheme the two are not necessarily equivalent, the balancing process
must ... often produce different results."' 3 Harlan also worried that "nation-
wide federal censorship" posed a danger to free thought "far greater than
anything the States may do."' 4 As a result, the states should have "wide, but
not... unrestricted, scope" to regulate speech, while the federal government
should be held "with a tight rein."'
' 5
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8. Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[H]istorical evidence does not bear out the claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment 'incorporates' the First in any literal sense.").
11. Id. at 504.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 505-06.
15. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 108:153
Free Speech Federalism
Despite these arguments, free speech doctrine accepted a formal congru-
ence among federal, state, and local speech laws. Indeed, by 1954, a note in
the Harvard Law Review could unhesitatingly state that "no distinction was
made between state and federal regulation"'' 6 in free speech cases. According
to William Van Alstyne:
[Tihe standard of judicial review for state or local laws affecting speech is
coextensive with the standard applicable to acts of Congress. The result is
that Supreme Court cases adjudicating state or local laws are fungible with
those adjudicating acts of Congress; each is as valid a source of precedent
for the other as it is valid for a case of its own kind."
Scholars still occasionally call for reviving the idea of treating federal
and state speech laws differently. Like Justice Harlan, they argue that state
speech restrictions be given more leeway than federal ones." Nevertheless,
the notion of disparate free speech treatment has been dormant in the courts
now for over half a century. At least that is what First Amendment doctrine
tells us.
B. Why Federalism?
Regardless of the doctrinal equivalence between federal, state, and local
speech restrictions, there are numerous reasons to suspect that the identity of
the government actor could shape judicial outcomes in free speech cases and
potentially other areas of individual rights. But many of these reasons point
in the opposite direction from that suggested by Justice Harlan and his occa-
sional brethren: federal laws should survive more often than state and local
laws.
First, federal courts might defer to federal lawmakers relative to state
and local lawmakers. A growing literature in political science and law ar-
gues that judges often act strategically when exercising judicial review.' 9 In
16. Note, Limiting State Action by the Fourteenth Amendment: Consequences of Abandoning
the Theory of First Amendment Incorporation, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1954). Justice Har-
lan's opinions on treating federal and state free speech laws differently appeared after this Note,
suggesting he was trying to tear down a doctrinal wall already built.
17. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 143.
18. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 180-81 (1971); Earl M. Maltz, Individual Rights and State Autonomy, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 163, 189 (1989); Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical
Examination of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L.
& POL. 223, 244-47 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Context].
19. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Forrest
Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court
Decision -Making. in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 43, 48-51 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing the scholarly support for the "separation of powers" game); Evan H.
Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297
(1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523
(1992); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 565, 566 (1992); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 51-56 (1993). Often referred to as a "separa-
tion of powers" game, strategic judging is mostly studied in the context of statutory interpretation
November 2009]
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deciding cases, judges often anticipate the potential reaction of other gov-
ernmental actors and shape their decisions in ways designed to minimize
backlash-what has been termed a "separation of powers" game.' ° In the
federal government, Congress and the Executive have both carrots and
sticks to encourage judicial compliance with their policies. Among the car-
rots are judicial promotion; numerous scholarly studies suggest that federal
judges may shape their behavior to enhance their chances of being elevated
to a higher court. 2' Among the sticks are constitutional amendment, 22 inten-
tional reshaping of the judiciary through a politicized nomination
process, 23'court packing24 (or unpacking 25), impeachment,26 and budget 27 and
281salary reduction. Congress can also adopt laws stripping the courts of ju-
risdiction over particular matters, as happened during Reconstruction 2 and
has been threatened repeatedly since the Warren Court days. 3 According to
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, "there is a growing body of empirical
evidence indicating that the Court bends its decisions to avoid overrides or
other political discipline."'"
but, as Barry Friedman argues, the phenomenon has salience in constitutional cases. Barry Fried-
man, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REV. 257, 313-16 (2005).
20. See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1529, 1556-57 (2000) (noting that the judiciary must maintain a good relationship with Con-
gress to avoid backlash).
21. Cf Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 313-15
(2004) (proposing a method whereby judges are scored according to various metrics, which would
result in the highest scorers being elevated to higher courts).
22. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 313 (noting that amending the Constitution is one way to
constrain a "troublesome judiciary").
23. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 619, 624 (2003) (noting that Presidents have always "looked to ideology in making judicial
picks"); Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A
Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCl. 1069, 1071 (1999).
24. See William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 592-93
(2004) (describing Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
25. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty; Part I1: Recon-
struction 's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 39 (2002) (recognizing that the Reconstruction Congress
reduced the number of Justices on the Supreme Court to prevent President Andrew Johnson from
nominating his allies).
26. See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Inde-
pendence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1999) (discussing the possibility of Congress
impeaching judges for political reasons).
27. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 345-46
(1988).
28. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 85 (1991).
29. Friedman, supra note 19, at 25-37 (describing jurisdiction stripping in the Reconstruc-
tion era).
30. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political
Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 378-83, 386-94 (1992) (describing modem-era jurisdiction-stripping
efforts).
31. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 IARv. L. REv. 26, 37 (1994).
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In contrast to Congress and the Executive, state and local governments
have relatively little ability to discipline federal courts for overly aggressive
judicial review. Prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, state
officials had "institutional weapons" that "could be used to influence out-
comes at the Supreme Court and other federal courts if those courts
threatened the institutional interests of state legislatures."" For example,
state legislators could appoint Senators who might threaten to vote against
judicial nominees thought to be hostile to state interests. But once Senators
were popularly elected rather than accountable to state legislatures, courts
were "free to hold state laws unconstitutional without significant fear [of]
... retaliation."'33 Local lawmakers have even less ability than state lawmak-
ers to discipline federal judges, with little more than the power to complain
about judicial rulings. State interests are still presumably represented, at
least in part, by popularly elected senators-even though the direct interests
of the state legislature no longer impinge on the confirmation process. Local
lawmakers don't even have that small remnant of influence on federal judi-
cial nominees. William Landes and Richard Posner have recognized that
federal courts tend to be reluctant to invalidate federal laws, yet such hesita-
tion diminishes "as we move from regulation that is less local to regulation
that is more local.
' 34
Even if federal judges do not fear discipline, they might still defer to
federal lawmakers because they trust them more than state and local law-
makers when it comes to matters of fundamental rights. 3  The Supreme
Court has given voice to a certain prejudice against state and local govern-
ments before. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the famous
flag salute case, the Court wrote that "small and local authority may feel
less sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of publicity
,,36may be less vigilant in calling it to account. In terms of individual rights,
the state and local governments earned a reputation for being untrustworthy
in the most important high-profile constitutional controversy of the twenti-
eth century: the struggle for civil rights for racial minorities. Localism in
32. Donald J. Kochan, State Laws and the Independent Judiciary: An Analysis of the Effects
of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Number of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws Uncon-
stitutional, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2003).
33. Id. Indeed, in the wake of the Seventeenth Amendment, the federal courts became much
more aggressive in reviewing state laws, as evidenced both doctrinally-incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the states-and quantitatively-a significant rise in the frequency of judicial invalida-
tion of state measures with no corresponding rise in the frequency of federal laws being invalidated.
See id. at 1047-54.
34. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875, 891 (1975).
35. Cf James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in
State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1780-81 (2003) ("[Tlhe Warren Court
gained its reputation as a guardian of liberty largely at the expense of state courts, which it repeat-
edly reversed in reaching many of its most significant rights-protective rulings.").
36. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943).
37. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990). As Barry Friedman writes, "[t]he states, by the 1950s and 1960s, had
November 2009]
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particular has suffered from its association with an ideology of racial segre-
gation. According to David Barron, there is a "deep-seated intuition that
local governments are islands of private parochialism which are likely to
frustrate the effective enforcement of federal constitutional rights.",3s By con-
trast, the modem constitutional tradition "asserts that rights-protecting
institutions like the Court or the federal government are required to con-
strain local exercises of power that oppress minorities."' 9
Another reason federal laws might survive more often than state or local
laws stems from the supply side of constitutional adjudication: federal laws
may be of higher quality than state laws, and state laws may be of higher
quality than local laws. "Quality," as I use the term here, refers to the
expected fit between the law and existing constitutional doctrine. A high-
quality law is one that, ex ante, would be predicted to have a strong
likelihood of surviving judicial review because it corresponds to controlling
precedent. A poor-quality law, by contrast, is one that a reasonable lawyer
would predict will be invalidated based on the case law.
To understand why the level of government might affect the constitu-
tional quality of a law, we can return to our original and greatest
constitutional theorist: James Madison. Madison in Federalist 10 focused on
the problem of "faction"-groups of citizens united by a "common impulse
of passion . . . adverse to the rights of other citizens' 40 who threatened core
rights, such as speech.41 Although Madison believed that "the causes of fac-
tion cannot be removed,"42 he reasoned that the national government would
better protect against their tyranny than state and local governments. Ac-
cording to Madison, "[tlhe smaller the society, the fewer probably will be
the distinct parties and interests composing it," the more risk of "local pre-
judices and schemes of injustice," and "the more easily will they concert and
execute their plans of oppression."43 In contrast, the national government
would be sufficiently large that no faction could easily achieve dominance.
4
"Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;
sullied their reputations as protectors of civil rights," with "state's rights" a rallying cry of those
opposed to the inclusion and equality of racial minorities. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
MINN. L. REv. 317, 372 (1997).
38. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism. 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487,487-88 (1999).
39. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1822 (2004). As Friedman notes, after mid-century the courts did
not forsake deference to lawmakers in matters of civil rights; rather, that deference was just reori-
ented away from states and toward national decisionmakers. See Friedman, supra note 37, at 372.
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
41. See Norman R. Williams 11, Note, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of
Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 970 (1994).
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 40, at 80.
43. Id. at 83-84.
44. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 929 (1985) ("Madi-
son looked to the federal legislative process, in which no interest group could achieve dominance, to
prevent oppression by locally entrenched factions.").
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you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens ....
Modem public-choice theory largely concurs with Madison's assess-
ment. Lawmaking is often the product of bargains between politically
influential interest groups and government officials. But because of differ-
ences in interest group pressures-akin to Madison's "factions" 46--one
would expect, in the words of Jonathan Macey, federal law to be a "higher
quality product than state law.' 47 Owing to the relatively large number of
interests represented by both elected officials and lobbying groups, federal
lawmaking tends to require compromise and moderation, 48 diluting the like-
lihood of any piece of legislation catering to a specific, potentially
oppressive interest. 49 Such bargaining is especially hard for an interest that is
out of the mainstream, as it must co-opt mainstream elements in order to be
successful. At the state (and even more so, the local) level, by contrast, the
range of represented interests tends to be smaller and the constituencies
more homogenous 0 As a result, oppressive legislation is easier to achieve in
a single state or municipality than at the national level.5 This is especially
true for groups out of the national mainstream that nevertheless fit com-
fortably within the culture or demographics of a single state or locality.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 40, at 83; see also Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced
Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 734 n.208 (1997). Madison also believed that,
at the federal level, factions would be enfeebled by the rivalries among the three branches of gov-
emnment. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 276 (1998).
46. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 1329; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public
Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 102-03 (2000); Williams, supra note 41,
at 966-67. Many scholars use special-interest groups and factions interchangeably. See, e.g., Mi-
chael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the
Inplications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1315-16 (1991).
47. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 272 (1990);
see also John P Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 218-21 (1997); William P Marshall,
Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 723 (1995); Thomas S. Ulen, Eco-
nomic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 921, 940-41 (1998); Ernest
A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEx. L. REV. , 76-77 (2004).
48. See Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 471 n.5 (2005)
(noting the wider array of interest groups at the national level); Deborah Tussey, UCITA, Copyright,
and Capture, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 319, 346 (2003) ("Federal legislators should be less
subject to capture than state legislators, because a greater number of interest groups have a voice at
the federal level than at the state level.").
49. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 49-50 (1979); see also Andrew J. Green,
Public Participation, Federalism and Environmental Law, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 191 (1999);
Williams, supra note 41, at 978.
50. As Richard Revesz explains with regard to environmental interest groups, "the national
aggregation of environmental interests results in the loss of homogeneity of interests...." Richard
L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV.
553, 563 (2001).
51. See Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate over Federal Ver-
sus State Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2153 (1993) ("[L]obbying efforts at the federal level
are more costly than at the state level.").
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Moreover, where constituents are relatively homogenous, legislators can
gain political capital by pursuing policies that run directly counter to pre-
vailing national norms, even constitutional ones." That the federal courts are
likely to overturn a law that mandates, say, prayer in school, may provide an
additional reason for some local politicians to enact it. Their constituents
may like that they are "standing up" to the federal courts and the erroneous
decisions of the Supreme Court. Additionally, as one moves down the feder-
alist hierarchy, we might expect more speech burdens to be adopted without
the attention of the press and organized national interest groups. When a
local public library considers denying access to one of its meeting rooms to
a religious group, no organized interests are likely to even know about it
much less lobby to stop it. The ACLU may not notice the local public li-
brary's decision, but it will know about every proposed federal law or
federal agency regulation that burdens speech.
There are also differences in the resources available to lawmakers at the
different levels of government which enhance the possibility of constitution-
ally unsound laws being adopted as we descend from the federal to the
local. The federal government has comparatively greater resources behind
its legislative processes to devote to ensuring the durability of its laws than
do state and local governments. Federal lawmakers have large staffs, both
individually and in committees, that vet legislation and that are often made
up of skilled lawyers. Moreover, the wealthier, larger interest groups com-
peting on the national stage can devote more resources to examining
legislation and uncovering its flaws. State legislative staffs are smaller, less
well funded, and have fewer skilled lawyers.53 At the local level the problem
is even worse; city councils, policymakers in school boards and libraries,
and other municipal-level officials often have little or no legal staffing what-
54
soever.
One is tempted to try to sort out the differences between judicial defer-
ence and qualitative differences in legal output. But these reasons are likely
to be mutually reinforcing rather than exclusive. If, for instance, federal
courts are relatively hostile to state and local laws restricting fundamental
52. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1484, 1503 (1987) (book review) (noting that decentralized decisionmaking coupled with
factional politics makes it "more, not less, likely that communities will adopt a radical, controversial
form of social organization").
53. See Patrice M. Arent, Lawyers Needed in the State Legislative Process, UTAH B.J., Oct.
1997, at 24 (noting that Utah's state assembly has only fourteen lawyers on staff, some of whom
work only part time).
54. At least this is what local lawmakers and the lawyers who represent them tell me. When I
presented this paper to a group of lawyers who represent local governments in free speech cases,
they told me that local lawmakers rarely consider the constitutionality of proposals with any depth.
They reported that lawmakers rarely even talk to them, their lawyers, until it's too late and litigation
has begun. This problem affects even the largest cities. Former Los Angeles City Councilman Jack
Weiss, in a talk to the UCLA law faculty, recounted how he was the only trained lawyer on the
council when he was elected. He requested a copy of the Los Angeles municipal code for his office,
but the request took two years to be fulfilled. If the lack of legal training and access to legal materi-
als in Los Angeles is typical, one would expect that local lawmakers are relatively likely to adopt
laws that run afoul of constitutional standards.
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rights, it may be due to the exposure of the federal courts to state and local
laws that too often stray from existing constitutional standards. Indeed, as
noted, state and especially local lawmakers earned a degree of distrust by
fighting against civil rights and other expansions of fundamental rights in
the mid-twentieth century. In turn, the perception of hostility to their laws
may make lower-level lawmakers even less inclined to concern themselves
with the eventual judicial reaction to their legal product. Conceptually, judi-
cial hostility to state and local laws can be distinguished from poor-quality
lawmaking; practically, they may be part and parcel of the same underlying
phenomenon.
So good reasons exist to believe that the identity of a governmental actor
may shape the outcomes of judicial decisions on the constitutionality of free
speech burdens. Some of these reasons emphasize the incentives for federal
judges to treat federal laws more leniently, while others suggest that the
quality of lawmaking varies depending on the level of government. To what
extent do recent free speech decisions in the federal courts reflect these
theories of free speech federalism? It is to this question that we now turn.
II. FREE SPEECH TAILORING IN PRACTICE
A. The Case Law: An Overview
To analyze the role of different levels of government in free speech cas-
es, I first collected55 and coded every published federal court decision that
considered the constitutionality of a restriction on "core" free speech rights
decided over a 14-year period. I choose the years 1990 through 2003 to se-
cure a sufficient number of cases to derive robust results. I focus here on
free speech cases where, under existing doctrine, the courts impose the most
rigorous form of constitutional review, strict scrutiny. Courts use this test for
speech restrictions that touch the heart of the First Amendment, namely,
political speech and similar content-based restrictions on expression. I in-
cluded only "final" district, circuit, and Supreme Court decisions;
overturned or affirmed decisions were omitted to avoid double counting.56
55. The free speech cases were originally collected as part of a study of all strict scrutiny
cases during the revelant years. The methodology for that study is discussed in Adam Winkler, Fatal
in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 793, 809-12 (2006).
56. Many free speech controversies are the subject of multiple rulings in the federal courts,
such as when a published district court decision is subsequently appealed to the circuit court, which
also publishes an opinion. To avoid double counting, this study reports only the final ruling on the
merits within a given litigation; if there was an appeal, only the last court to issue an opinion on the
relevant free speech issue was counted. Because some free speech issues are the subject of prelimi-
nary-injunction rulings but no subsequent final ruling on the merits, for purposes of this study I have
also counted these preliminary-injunction rulings within the dataset. (Preliminary-injunction rulings
are not final rulings on the merits, but to succeed a plaintiff must show a "substantial likelihood of
success on the merits." See, e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1115 (10th Cir. 2006).)
Only those preliminary-injunction rulings that decided issues that were not subsequently dealt with
by a later court in that same litigation were included. These final preliminary-injunction rulings
were included to gain as much traction as possible in core free speech cases, where due to the long
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These data have their limitations. First, only federal court decisions are
included. State court rulings on free speech issues, whether stemming from
the federal or state constitutions, are not included and they may come out
differently. Second, the data are comprised only of free speech cases where
the federal courts applied strict scrutiny. Although the courts apply strict
scrutiny to the most important types of speech restrictions, not all speech
restrictions are adjudicated under this standard57 and other speech restric-
tions may or may not follow the patterns uncovered in strict scrutiny cases.
Third, I include only published decisions, which may or may not replicate
the larger set of decided free speech cases.
My research uncovered a total of 266 relevant free speech rulings. Of
those, only a small fraction (7, or 3%) was comprised of Supreme Court
rulings and the vast majority of decisions came from the circuit courts of
appeals (106, or 40%) and the district courts (153, or 56%).
The overall rate at which "core" free speech restrictions survived judi-
cial review was 21%. Courts upheld 56 of 266 speech restrictions in the
given period.
Of the 266 rulings on the constitutionality of speech restrictions, the vast
majority involved state and local laws. There were 227 rulings on state and
local laws and 39 rulings on federal laws. 8 As Table 1 indicates, the federal
courts upheld a much higher percentage of federal laws than state and local
laws.
expressed fear of a chilling effect from legislation burdening speech, preliminary injunctions are
very common.
In some decisions, courts considered the constitutionality of more than one speech restriction
under strict scrutiny. For purposes of this study, each application of strict scrutiny was counted as a
single observation; if a court applied that standard three different times to three different provisions
of a law within a single decision, each application was treated as its own separate occurrence. More-
over, while controls were used to ensure that individual controversies were not double counted,
some laws were subject to multiple lawsuits in different jurisdictions, leading to multiple rulings and
thus multiple observations. So a federal law challenged in two different circuits created two observa-
tions (unless the Supreme Court ruled on the issue, in which case only that final appellate ruling
counted).
57. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (com-
mercial speech); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (government as employer); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (content-neutral laws).
58. The smaller the number of observations, the harder it is for statistical analysis to provide
robust, dependable results. Having only thirty-nine federal court decisions is sufficient for ordinary




SURVIVAL RATE OF SPEECH LAWS
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT (STATE & LOCAL COMBINED) 9
Level of Government Survival Rate Applications (N)
State & Local 15% 227
Federal 56% 39
Total 21% 266
F = 37.760, df = 1, p < .000
According to this data, state and local speech laws were rarely upheld,
while more than half of the federal speech laws survived. State and local
laws survived only 15% of the time and federal laws survived 56% of the
time. This difference is statistically significant (p < .000).
Even before analyzing the differences between the various levels of gov-
ernment, these numbers are notable. The cases included in this study are
exclusively strict scrutiny cases. That standard, which is supposed to be the
most rigorous form of judicial scrutiny, has been famously called "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact.' 60 Yet not only do many speech laws survive strict
scrutiny, but well over half of the federal laws do. Clearly, strict scrutiny is
not really fatal in fact. This finding corresponds to other recent empirical
61work I have done on the strict scrutiny standard.
Table 1 combines all state and local laws together. This is sensible on
one hand because local governments are considered part of the larger gov-
ernment of the state in which they are located. Under existing constitutional
doctrine, local governments are not independent sovereignties; they are sub-62
sets of the state governments. But what if we distinguish between state and
local governments? Table 2 breaks out the free speech cases into federal,
state, and local governments, revealing how judicial scrutiny becomes less
likely to be satisfied as one descends the hierarchy of American government.
59. The numbers in the bottom row of this and other similar tables reflect statistical tests to
ensure the reliability and significance of the variation reported in the table. In other words, they tell
us how likely the variation between, say, the federal survival rate and the state-local survival rate is
just random error and not associated with the identity of the governmental actor. Most readers will
be primarily interested in the "p-value," which measures the probability that the numbers reported in
the table are random. The lower the p-value, the less likely the variation between the survival rates is
due to chance alone. The number reported with the "F" reflects an "F-Test," which is a measure to
determine if the differences between two standard deviation values are too large to be explained by
random error. And the "df," which is of interest only to more experienced readers of statistics, refers
to degrees of freedom, or the number of values that are free to vary.
60. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
61. See Winkler, supra note 55.
62. See Barron, supra note 38, at 487 ("The text of the Constitution does not mention local
governments, and black-letter constitutional law formally deems them to be the mere administrative
appendages of the states that 'create' them."); Schragger, supra note 39, at 1850 ("[T]he Court has
held that local governments are instrumentalities of the states and therefore do not have any inde-




SURVIVAL RATE OF SPEECH LAWS BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT:
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL SPEECH LAWS





F = 28.314, df = 2, p < .000
This breakdown of the speech cases uncovers a severe linear descent in
survival rates as we move from federal to state to local speech laws. State
laws survive less than half as often as federal laws (24% to 56%). The truly
remarkable number, however, is the survival rate of local speech laws (3%).
Local speech restrictions almost never survive strict scrutiny; of the 93 rul-
ings in the 14-year period covered by this study, in only 3 instances did the
courts uphold a local law burdening core speech rights. Strict scrutiny,
which is more often than not found to be satisfied when the federal govern-
ment is behind the challenged speech law, effectively amounts to a
categorical rule that local speech restrictions are unconstitutional.
Within the free speech decisions, there is a variety of different types of
speech laws. For example, there are campaign-finance laws, restrictions on
access to public forums, restrictions on commercial or residential signage,
laws regulating ballot-petition circulators, and other sorts of speech laws
subject to the strict scrutiny standard. Even though the same standard of
review applies to all of the speech laws in this study, it is worthwhile to
break out the laws by their doctrinal subgroup because there may be distinc-
tions in the controlling doctrine in each area of law that make laws within
that area more or less likely to survive. Table 3 shows the considerable





SURVIVAL RATE OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS BY DOCTRINAL SUBGROUP
Type of Speech Law Survival Rate Applications (N)
Right of Access to Courts 50% 26
Charitable Solicitation 47% 15
Indecent Speech 33% 21
Campaign Speech 30% 83
Petition-Circulator Speech 6% 16
Miscellaneous 6% 35
Public Forum 4% 51
Sign Ordinances 0% 19
Total 21% 266
F = 7.618, df = 7, p < .000
Given the variation in survival rates for different types of speech laws,
one might hypothesize that the variation in the success rate of federal, state,
and local laws is due to the types of laws each level of government adopts.
If, for example, the federal government adopts only right-of-access and
charitable-solicitation laws, then its relative success may simply be a func-
tion of the relatively lenient doctrinal rules in that area of law. It would not
be the identity of the governmental actor that mattered; it would be the type
of law that entity adopted.
To determine whether the variation in the survival rates between the dif-
ferent levels of government is simply a function of the types of laws they
adopt, we can examine areas of law in which both the federal government
and either the state or local governments legislate. Do the different levels of
government fare the same when they legislate in the same area? Table 4 re-
ports the survival rate of federal, state, and local speech laws cross-tabulated





SURVIVAL RATE OF SPEECH LAWS BY TYPE AND
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
63
Type of Law Level of Survival Rate Applications (N)
Government
Campaign Speech Federal 100% 4
State 29% 73
Local 0% 6
Chi-Square = 11.93, df = 2, p = .003
Access to Courts Federal 63% 19
State 14% 7
Local 0
Chi-Square = 4.887, df = 1, p = .027
Miscellaneous Federal 50% 2
State 8% 12
Local 0% 21
Chi-Square = 8.706, df = 2, p = .013
Indecency Laws Federal 50% 10
State 17% 6
Local 20% 5
Chi-Square = 2.40, df = 2, p = .301
Public Forum Federal 0% 4
State 0% 8
Local 5% 39
Chi-Square = 0.641, df = 2, p = .726
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that federal laws fare better than
state and local laws even when they adopt similar types of speech burdens.
There are five areas with overlapping regulation: campaign speech, right of
access to courts, indecency, public-forum restrictions, and the miscellaneous
(or default) category. With regard to campaign-speech laws, federal restric-
tions were upheld in every case, whereas only 29% of state laws and no
local laws were upheld. This variation was statistically significant (p =
.003). Federal restrictions on the media's right of access to judicial proceed-
ings were upheld more often than such restrictions adopted by the state
governments, 63% to 14%. This variation was also statistically significant (p
= .027). In the third category, miscellaneous speech laws, federal laws fared
better (50%) than state (8%) and local (0%) laws. While this variation was
63. The "Chi-square" test evaluates the numbers reported by reference to the chi-square
distribution. This tells us how good the fit is between the results and a theoretical distribution and
how independent the variation between the variables is.
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statistically significant (p = .013), the number of federal laws was very small
(2), making the comparison somewhat less useful.
The cross-tabulation results are not uniform. Indecency laws adopted by
the federal government appear more likely to be upheld than state or local
indecency laws (50% to 17% and 20% respectively) but the variation was
not statistically significant (p =.301). 64 In the public-forum cases, local laws
actually fared somewhat better (5%) than federal (0%) and state laws (0%),
although the variation was again not statistically significant (p = .726) and it
appears that federal courts are relatively unkind to restrictions on access to
public forums as a general matter.
B. The Case Law: A Model
Further confirmation that, even if we control for the substantive type of
speech regulation, the enacting level of government matters is provided by
an estimated regression model. This model indicates the likelihood of a
speech law surviving federal court scrutiny, controlling for two types of va-
riables: one, the enacting level of government; and two, the substantive
category of speech law involved in the controversy.65
64. A statistical test in which the state and local indecency laws were combined and then
compared to federal indecency laws made the variation more robust but the result was still below the
threshold for statistical significance.
65. Regression analysis is a common statistical tool that measures the relationship between
an observed result-here the survival rates-and the variables included in the analysis. The model
employs complementary log-log regression. The constant was comprised of state laws and charita-
ble-solicitation laws. Prior to estimating the model, simple descriptive statistics were employed to
test other potential variables for significance. Among those tested and rejected were 1) the party of
the president who appointed the deciding judge, which was used as a proxy for the judge's ideologi-
cal leanings; 2) the deciding circuit, which was used as a proxy for regional variation; and 3) the
date of decision, which was used to determine if courts were becoming more or less willing over
time to uphold a speech restriction. None of these variables, however, showed any significant rela-




THE DETERMINANTS OF SURVIVING FEDERAL COURT



















Constant (State, Charitable Solicitation) -0.412
(0.386)
Chi-Square 61.37
.p <.05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001
Constant = state laws, charitable-solicitation laws
N = 257 (sign ordinances omitted)
Dependent variable = surviving judicial review
Standard errors in parentheses
The model indicates that the level of government is a significant predic-
tor of surviving judicial review, controlling for the substantive type of
speech restriction. That a speech restriction is adopted by the federal gov-
emnment is highly correlated with the likelihood of surviving a legal
challenge (p < .00 1). All else being equal, federal laws are far more likely to
be upheld than state or local laws.66 The model indicates that the level of
government is a significant predictor of the likelihood that a speech restric-
tion will be upheld.
66. Note that there is one type of law omitted from the regression model: sign ordinances.
There were no sign ordinances in the data set that survived judicial scrutiny. Clearly, therefore, this
type of law is a significant predictor of failing review; the courts effectively employ a hard-and-fast
rule that none of these laws will be constitutional under strict scrutiny analysis. Yet, the total lack of
any survivors within the data set interfered with the regression model. In essence, the statistical
program was unable to predict the change in the likelihood of being upheld for a variable in which
there were no cases upheld. The sign-ordinance cases were therefore omitted from the model, but
simple logic tells us that this is a significant predictor of failure in the courts.
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C. The Case Law: A Granular Examination
The patterns found above require further examination. In this section, I
look more closely at the subgroups of free speech cases to see what lessons
the decisions have for free speech federalism. In some subgroups, there is
evidence that the federal courts are applying a relatively lenient form of ju-
dicial review to federal laws while being more demanding of state and local
laws. In others, there is evidence that state and local laws suffer from rela-
tively poor quality-that is, the laws stray far from existing rules of
constitutional doctrine.
This examination of the cases is not meant to sort out precisely the im-
pact of deference as compared to quality of lawmaking in free speech cases.
As noted earlier, these notions are likely to be reinforcing, not mutually ex-
clusive. Moreover, the cases do not lend themselves to determinate
assessments of the relative impact of deference or quality of lawmaking. To
obtain a reliable determination of deference, for example, would require
having sets of rulings on the same or very similar laws from each of the lev-
els of governments; these simply do not exist. While there is overlap in the
types of laws adopted, the precise details of the laws vary and, in constitu-
tional law, the details matter. Additionally, the courts will not be explicit that
they are employing deference to federal lawmakers when controlling Su-
preme Court doctrine declares that free speech principles apply equally to
all levels of government. Finally, the reasons for federal courts to defer to
federal actors are not the type of reasons that judges are likely to admit,
even to themselves. Indeed, such deference may be completely subcon-
scious.
This granular consideration of subgroups of speech laws also reveals
some other surprising aspects of free speech law. For example, the cases
show that many federal speech restrictions are not the product of the legisla-
ture or executive branch agencies-as traditional constitutional theory
supposes-but rather stem from the federal judiciary itself. Federal courts
often find themselves reviewing the constitutionality of speech restrictions
imposed by other federal courts. In this way, courts are not merely the pro-
tectors of rights, but also the lawmakers behind infringements of rights.
Moreover, the dynamics of judicial review might change when the "law-
makers" whose product is being reviewed by federal courts are themselves
federal court judges. Comity concerns may make reviewing courts even
more likely to uphold this type of federal law. Even in the absence of com-
ity, we might expect that federal judges will adopt laws that are unusually
likely to meet existing constitutional standards due to their expertise and
desire to avoid being overturned.
1. Right-of-Access Cases
One notable area of overlap between federal and state speech laws is the
right of access to judicial proceedings. Restrictions on the right of access
involve legislative enactments or court orders closing trials or government
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buildings, or sealing judicial materials from the media. Nearly half of all
federal speech regulations in the fourteen years covered by this study were
right-of-access restrictions. Federal laws in this area survived at a high rate
(63%), especially given the application of the demanding strict scrutiny test.
That restrictions on the right of access sometimes survive judicial scrutiny is
not entirely surprising given existing constitutional doctrine. The Supreme
Court has upheld restrictions on the right of access67 and, on several occa-
sions, expressed that such limits are well within constitutional boundaries
68even under strict scrutiny. Yet, only federal laws seemed to benefit from
this leniency. Similar state laws survived only in a single instance during the
fourteen years (14%).
The opinions betray evidence of deference in favor of federal lawmak-
ers. In several decisions, the federal courts go out of their way to justify
federal laws while employing greater skepticism to even relatively narrow
state laws. In United States v. McCorkle, which upheld an order sealing
transcripts of in camera proceedings sought by a newspaper, a federal court
declined to identify any underlying governmental interest that compelled the
secrecy and went so far as to declare that a number of other in camera pro-
ceedings were off limits even though the newspaper had not requested
69access to them. In United States v. Valenti, upholding the closure of bench
conferences, another court held that the newspaper seeking access had failed
to meet its burden of offering effective alternatives to complete closure.7°
Yet, under strict scrutiny the burden of showing no less-restrictive alterna-
tives belongs to the government, not the challenger.7' Moreover, the
newspaper had no information about what the subject of the bench confer-
ences was and thus could not reasonably be expected to offer suitable
alternatives to closure. In these illustrative cases, federal right-of-access re-
strictions were upheld because courts seemingly departed from the
traditional requirements of the strict scrutiny standard.
In contrast, the federal courts in cases involving state laws often bent
over backward to invalidate the restrictions. In Lind v. Grimmer, a court in-
validated the application of a state law denying media access to pending
complaints filed with the state campaign-finance spending commission.
72
The court reasoned that the government interest in encouraging people to
run for office was not protected by the restriction because complainants and
67. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (affirming a right-of-access restric-
tion against reporters seeking to videotape and photograph a prison).
68. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that closure is
allowed where there is a specific finding of a substantial probability of prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (noting that case-
by-case determinations of the necessity for closure may be constitutionally permissible).
69. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
70. 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11 th Cir. 1993).
71. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) ("Under the
strict-scrutiny test, [the party defending the content-based speech restriction] ha[s] the burden to
prove that the ... clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest.").
72. 30 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1994).
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others remained free to air their charges informally to the public.73 Yet, the
same could be said about any restriction on the right of access. These cases
deal only with denials of access to judicial materials, not prior restraints on
publication of the information if obtained from another source. In Rapp v.
Disciplinary Board of Hawaii Supreme Court, which invalidated a state law
barring lawyers from ex parte, postverdict communications with jurors,74 a
court held the law was ill tailored because it applied only to ex parte ac-
cess.75 As a result, "two unscrupulous lawyers who agree to interview jurors
together" could "engage in a jury harassment 'free for all' with no court su-
pervision. 76 The court offered no explanation of why lawyers representing
opposing sides in litigation would have any incentive to jointly harass jurors.
Indeed, the requirement that all sides to a dispute be present was the safe-
guard to ensure that harassment did not occur. With that measure
invalidated, the unscrupulous lawyer was freed to speak to jurors alone, in-
creasing the likelihood of harassment.
There is also some evidence that federal laws restricting access to court
are occasionally of relatively higher quality than such laws adopted at the state
level. Of the federal right-of-access cases in the dataset, one finds numerous
restrictions that one would expect courts to uphold given the underlying sig-
nificance of the governmental interests involved. Three involve restrictions on
media access to materials in terrorism trials where the denial of access is justi-
fied by national-security interests.77 Six access restrictions were put in place to
protect the identity of minorsTS-a governmental interest that courts tradition-
ally respect. Another three cases involve restrictions designed to avoid
disclosure of grand jury deliberations,79 the long-established secrecy of which
has been repeatedly approved by the Supreme Court.80 These laws are often
very narrow in their tailoring, too, restricting media access only to an individ-
ual hearing," one witness's testimony, 2 or a particular document.13 They arenot broad, restrictive limits on access.
73. Id. at 1120.
74. 916 E Supp. 1525, 1528 (D. Haw. 1996).
75. Id. at 1537.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Res-
sam, 221 F Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Three Juveniles, 862 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mass. 1994); United
States v. Jacobson, 785 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Va. 1992).
79. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 806 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Del. 1992).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) ("We consistently
have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings."); Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)
(same).
81. See, e.g., United States v. McCorkle, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
82. See, e.g., Jacobson, 785 E Supp. 563.
83. See, e.g., Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Although there were seven state laws restricting the media's right of ac-
cess, only one survived federal judicial review. A closer look at the cases
suggests that the state cases do not deal with access restrictions of equal
constitutional strength as the federal laws: a state that essentially made all of
its criminal case files inaccessible; a protective order that barred a reporter
from revealing something he had heard in open court;85 and legislation clos-
86ing preliminary hearings in felony cases -a practice the Supreme Court
explicitly held was unconstitutional in one of its foundational right-of-
access cases. 87 State lawmakers are imposing restrictions on the right of
access that are overly broad, and thus more susceptible to invalidation.
One of the most intriguing revelations in the right-of-access cases is how
often federal laws of this sort are the product of the federal judiciary itself
rather than Congress or executive agencies. Although traditional constitu-
tional theory posits judicial review as the exercise of authority to adjudicate
the validity of laws produced by the elected branches, the vast majority of
federal right-of-access restrictions were put in place by federal judges. The
judges imposed the orders in unusual cases to close a courtroom or seal doc-
uments. Of the 19 observed federal right-of-access restrictions adjudicated,
16 were put in place by federal courts and only 3 were adopted by Congress
or the executive. All federal right-of-access laws were about equally likely
to survive review-the courts upheld 63% of right of access restrictions im-
posed by federal judges and 67% of such laws adopted by the elected
branches-but the frequency of judicial orders coming up for review sug-
gests a modification to the reasons put forward earlier for judicial leniency
toward federal lawmakers.
In addition to federal courts being motivated by a "separation of pow-
ers" game in which they maintain the power and legitimacy of the courts by
avoiding backlash, there may also be a "shared powers" game. By this, I
mean that the federal courts may tend to uphold burdens put in place by oth-
er federal judges out of a sense of comity to their institutional colleagues.
The federal judiciary as a whole has an interest in buttressing the authority
of its members. Hostile appellate review of other federal judges' right-of-
access restrictions could also undermine respect for judicial orders more
generally or weaken the power of federal judges to issue orders controlling
the integrity of their proceedings.
2. Campaign-Speech Cases
Campaign-speech restrictions are adopted by federal, state, and local
governments. But despite the formal equivalence in doctrine between cam-
paign-speech restrictions-such as campaign-finance laws and electioneering
limits near polling places-federal laws have fared far better than state laws.
84. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1993).
85. See Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette v. Baker, 788 F Supp. 379 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
86. See Rivera Puig v. Garcia Rosario, 785 F Supp. 278 (D.P.R. 1992).
87. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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State laws, in turn, have fared far better than local laws. Over the covered
period, federal courts upheld every federal campaign-speech restriction, 29
percent of similar state laws, and none of the local laws.
In campaign-speech decisions, one also finds examples of the courts
treating federal laws differently than state and local laws. In one state law
case, for example, a court invalidated a law limiting the amount of money
88registered lobbyists could donate to candidates for elected office. The court
explained that the law had a "direct quantitative effect on political commu-
nication and association"89 and the threat of corruption between lobbyists
and candidates was based wholly on "allegations" with no "showing of ac-
tual improprieties." 90 By contrast, in considering a broader federal regulation
barring municipal securities professionals from making any contribution to
state candidates with whom they solicit business, 9' another court brushed
aside the fact that "the record contains no evidence of specific instances" of
impropriety-only "allegations"-by insisting that the underlying corrup-
tion was "self-evident[]" and "apparent."92 Departing from strict scrutiny's
traditional rigidity, the court in the latter case wrote that, while the law
might be underinclusive, strict scrutiny did not mandate "the best available
fit between means and ends."93 But that is exactly what "least restrictive al-
ternative" means.
Another case addressing a federal campaign-speech restriction betrays
clear evidence of deference: the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, which upheld the "electioneering communi-
cations" provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).94
Whereas established doctrine held that campaign-finance restrictions were
unconstitutionally overbroad if they restricted speech about candidates that
fell short of "express advocacy"-specific exhortations to vote for or against
a candidate9-the McConnell Court upheld a provision that barred corpora-
tions and unions from making expenditures merely mentioning a candidate's
name within a given period of time before an election.16 Moreover, under
strict scrutiny, the provision did not seem to have the close fit required. By
barring all expenditures that even pictured a candidate's face during election
season, the law conceivably could have restricted speech having nothing to
do with elections at all.97 As a result, many election law experts recognized
88. Barker v. Ethics Bd., 841 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
89. Id. at 259.
90. Id. at 260.
91. Blount v. SEC, 61 F3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
92. Id. at 944-45.
93. Id. at 946.
94. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
96. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190-91 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II 2002)).
97. In his McConnell dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy offered an example: just prior to an
election of a safe-seat incumbent, an environmental group wishes to take out an advertisement
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that the provision was on shaky constitutional grounds under established
doctrine. 9s Indeed, the BCRA even included a backup provision that would
become effective should the electioneering communications provision meet
its expected doom in the courts. 9  Yet, the Supreme Court upheld the law,
avoiding any real substantive analysis of the fit between the ends and the
ltf)means.
The constitutional quality of the campaign-speech laws may also play a
role-although, with the relatively poor constitutional quality of the federal
law in McConnell, one suspects that deference is an important factor. State
and local governments often adopt campaign-speech restrictions about
which the Supreme Court has previously expressed constitutional doubts.
For example, several states have attempted to ban anonymous campaign
literature,' °' even though the Supreme Court has directly held that such bans• • 102
are unconstitutional. Numerous state and local governments have imposed
limits on campaign expenditures by candidates,03 in obvious contravention
of the Supreme Court's clear holding in Buckley v. Valeo that expenditure
limits violate the First Amendment. 4 Still other states have tried to limit the
speech of candidates running for judicial office,' 5 another practice the
Supreme Court has clearly (though, in fairness to the states, only recently)• 106
disapproved. Where states regulate something the Supreme Court has ap-
proved, their laws fare much better; state disclosure laws, for instance,
survive in nearly 40 percent of observed rulings.
against a logging law sponsored by the incumbent. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 287 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. See, e.g., Jan Witold Baran, Compelled Disclosure of Independent Political Speech and
Constitutional Limitations, 35 IND. L. REv. 769, 776 (2002) ("These proposed 'electioneering com-
munication' provisions likely would not survive a constitutional challenge.").
99. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 401, 116 Stat. 81,
112.
100. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
101. See Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (discussing state statute pre-
scribing such restrictions); W. Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. W. Va.
1996) (same).
102. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
103. See Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (granting injunctive
relief to mayoral candidate who brought First Amendment challenge against city charter provision
limiting campaign expenditures); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
unconstitutional a city ordinance that imposed limits on city council campaign expenditures).
104. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) ("We conclude, however, that the limitations on
campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expendi-
tures by a candidate from his personal funds are constitutionally infirm.").
105. See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute prohibiting candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds).




Restrictions on "indecent" speech-that is, speech that is sexually ex-
plicit but short of pornography-are also a type of speech law adopted by
each of the three levels of government. Like other "core" free speech bur-
dens, indecent (but not obscene or child-pornographic) speech triggers
strict scrutiny. Yet, federal laws survived frequently (50%), and at a higher
rate than state (17%) and local (20%) laws regulating indecency. These
results are consistent with the larger pattern of free speech cases, but the
difference in the survival rates of federal, state, and local laws was not
found to be statistically significant-a result that may be due to the small
number of overall cases.
Some of the language and reasoning of the indecency decisions sug-
gest a measure of deference being applied to federal laws. Action for
Children's Television v. Federal Communications Commission'07 is indica-
tive. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a
federal ban on indecent television broadcasts between the hours of 6 a.m.
and midnight. 10 The ban, the court admitted, was underinclusive: more
than 1 in 5 teenagers between the ages of 12 and 17, and 6 percent of chil-
dren aged 2 to 11, watch television between 11 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.; 1 in 6
teenagers watch as late as 1 a.m.'09 A more precisely tailored ban might
allow indecent broadcasts during school hours on weekdays, when chil-
dren are unlikely to be watching television. Yet the court discarded this
argument first by noting that some children are too young to go to school,
without acknowledging that children 4-years old and younger are highly
unlikely to channel surf and happen upon indecent programs.' ° The court
then went further and essentially disregarded the least-restrictive means
analysis altogether: "[E]ven if such fine tuning were feasible, we do not
believe the First Amendment requires that degree of precision."''. Rather
than least-restrictive means, the court explicitly invokes "balancing," and
argues that the question of where "it is most reasonable to permit indecent
broadcasts is the kind of judgment better left to Congress .... [H]ere, we
defer to Congress's determination .... Commentators have argued that
107. 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
108. Id. at 656.
109. Id. at 665.
110. Id. at 666.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 667. Such strict scrutiny schizophrenia was only made more apparent by the court's
subsequent rejection of an exception for public broadcasters' programs aired after 10 p.m. After
arguing in the first part of the opinion that Congress had a compelling interest in restricting indecent
programming between 11 p.m. and midnight, the court turned around in the latter part and held that
the public-broadcaster exception shows the interest is not compelling after 10 p.m. and requires the
ban to end at that earlier hour. Id. at 669-70.
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this decision employed "a strict-scrutiny-light algorithm" 3 that was "es-
sentially a less-than-strict scrutiny."
14
Yet Action for Children's Television also shows the difficulty of separat-
ing lenient judicial treatment of federal laws from quality of law variation.
To the extent that federal indecency restrictions fit more comfortably within
First Amendment doctrine than state and local indecency laws, it may be the
result of the Supreme Court crafting lower doctrinal hurdles for federal law.
Consider that while all indecency restrictions supposedly face the same de-
manding standard of review, the Court has long recognized that television
broadcasting is uniquely open to regulation."5 All broadcast regulation,
however, is federal; the state and local governments regulate other types of
indecency, such as written matter. Thus, when the Court holds that broad-
casting is different, one cannot be sure whether it is really something unique
about broadcasting that leads to that holding or whether the Court is em-
ploying some degree of deference because such regulation always comes
from federal lawmakers. Which comes first-the deference or the doctrine?
4. Miscellaneous Speech Cases
The case law was filled with a hodgepodge of speech restrictions that
defied easy categorization and which I have grouped together in a default
category: "miscellaneous" speech restrictions. The laws categorized in this
way do not belong to any recognized subgroup of First Amendment doc-
trine. Rather, these laws are unusual or unorthodox-or, less charitably,
bizarre. They include restrictions such as a policy adopted by a public uni-
versity that prohibited fraternities from sponsoring "ugly girl" contests;' 6 a
law banning the sale of trading cards representing violent criminals;"7 bans
on fortunetelling;" s and restrictions on "gangster" rap" 9 and the sale of vio-
lent video games.120
Federal laws in this category were few-only 2 federal court rulings,
constituting 5% of all federal speech restrictions adjudicated-but survived
113. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1574 (2005).
114. Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC Crack Down on Indecency,
CoMm. LAW., Spring 2004, at 1, 27; see also Gregory B. Phillips, Note, Indecent Content on Satel-
lite Radio: Should the FCC Step In?, 26 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 237, 267-68 (2006) (noting that
the court's scrutiny was "less rigid than the strict scrutiny warranted by content-based regulations").
115. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (explaining that "of all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection").
Strict scrutiny "light" is a consequence of the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, the accessibility
available to children, and the captivity of the audience. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
116. IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1993).
117. Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997).
118. Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 1999).
119. Torries v. Hebert, 111 F. Supp. 2d 806 (W.D. La. 2000).
120. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
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at a higher rate (50%) than state laws (8%) and local laws (0%) falling in the
default category. State and local laws in this area were far more common,
with 12 state law decisions (9% of all rulings on state laws) and 21 local law
decisions (23% of all rulings on local laws).
With so few federal cases to examine, it is difficult to analyze how def-
erence to federal lawmakers might influence these cases. We can gain some
traction, however, on the quality-of-law issue. Consider, first, that the fact
that the laws are so unusual itself suggests that the laws are not likely to
satisfy existing constitutional standards. As the noted state court jurist Hans
Linde writes, "[w]hen many states do not pursue a goal, characterizing it as
compelling rings hollow."'12 Furthermore, many of these bizarre laws pre-
dictably fail the demands of existing doctrine. For example, the handful of
restrictions on speech associated with violence, such as the violent video
game or trading-card ban, regulate speech that cannot reasonably be said to
threaten an imminent breach of the peace. Yet that is the established stan-
dard for unprotected violent speech.12 As the data above suggest, such
poorly formed laws are rarely adopted at the federal level, but are common
at the state and especially local level. This provides support for the idea that
state and local governments are relatively prone to adopt speech restrictions
that are of questionable constitutional validity.
5. Public-Forum-Access Cases
One area of free speech law where federal laws do not survive at a high-
er rate than similar state and local laws involves restrictions on access to
public forums. Of the 4 federal laws adjudicated, all were invalidated. Of the
8 state laws, all were also invalidated. But local laws fared slightly better-
although the difference is not statistically significant-with 2 of 39 laws
surviving (5%).
From these rulings, it does not appear that federal lawmakers are receiv-
ing any unusual deference when they adopt restrictions on access to public
forums. And even though local laws fare slightly better than similar federal
and state laws, there is no particularly telling evidence of judicial leniency
to local lawmakers. With only 2 survivors and 37 fatalities, local laws re-
stricting access to public forums still face a near categorical rule of
invalidity.
What these rulings suggest is that lawmakers generally-and local law-
makers in particular-spend far too much time adopting poor-quality speech
restrictions regarding public forums. Public-forum-access restrictions are far
from constitutional norms of acceptability. Local governments are especially
fond of adopting this type of speech restriction, which make up almost half
of all speech burdens at the local level. Consider a few of the public forum
121. Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How: The Systemic Incoherence of
"Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219, 235 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.,
1993).
122. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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laws adopted by local governments: denials of the opportunity to speak dur-
ing the public-comment period of a government meeting, justified by the
governmental end of avoiding offense to the council members' sense of pro-
priety; 2 1 prohibitions on certain advertisements on public buses to minimize
the disruption that might result from controversial ads;'24 bans on the distri-
bution in a public forum of leaflets advertising erotic dancing, defended as a
means of enhancing the community's quality of life' 2 ' and bars on display
of religious signs at a football stadium designed to avoid upsetting the
crowd. 26 Such justifications all come down to a desire to avoid controversy,
but as the Supreme Court explained in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, "the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground
for restricting speech in a public forum."'27 Although Cornelius was decided
in 1985, well before the cases in this study were decided, governments-
especially local governments-continue to adopt and defend speech-
restrictive laws relying on this same governmental objective.
These public-forum restrictions and others like them-such as access
denials to gays,12 white supremacists,"' antiabortion groups, 3 or religious'3'
groups -may nonetheless serve the political interests of local officials,
who seek to please locally powerful interest groups by restricting the speech
of disfavored minorities. In the absence of sufficiently strong competing
interest-group pressures-and perhaps, given the terrible track record of
public-forum restrictions in court, sound legal advice-even such constitu-
tionally weak laws continue to be adjudicated in federal court.
The granular examination of the case law offered in this Part is only
suggestive. Not every case shows evidence of deference by courts or varia-
tion in the quality of lawmaking at the different levels of government. This
comes as no surprise because the courts claim to be applying the same strict
scrutiny standard and do not formally consider the identity of the govern-
mental actor in adjudicating cases. What is surprising is the good number of
instances where evidence of judicial deference comes through in the opin-
ions, or where the relatively poor lawmaking of state and local government
officials is readily apparent.
123. See Zapach v. Dismuke, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
124. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320
(N.D. Ga. 2000).
125. See S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998).
126. See Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia Armory Bd., 789 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1992).
127. 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
128. Cimarron Alliance Found. v. City of Oklahoma City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Okla.
2002).
129. Nationalist Movement v. City of Boston, 12 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 1998).
130. Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998).




This Part examines two important implications of the federalism effect
found in free speech cases. The first is how this pattern and its potential
causes might affect recent efforts to promote devolution as part of a "feder-
alism revolution." The second relates to a burgeoning trend in case law and
legal scholarship favoring the formal "tailoring" of rights along institutional
lines to allow some governmental entities, such as universities and prisons,
special leeway to burden fundamental rights.
A. The Dangers of Devolution
Perhaps the most significant constitutional trend of the past two decades
has been the so-called "federalism revolution." After half a century of cen-
tralizing constitutional authority in the federal government-and
correspondingly diminishing the power of state and local governments-the
Rehnquist Court and a cadre of legal scholars argued for reversing course.
This states' rights revolution has centered primarily on Congress's power to
regulate commerce and state immunity from federally imposed man-
dates. "'33 But it has also begun to touch questions of constitutional rights.
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, has called for reinterpreting the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause to impose limits on only the federal
government and not the states.3 4 Several notable scholars have similarly
called for greater state or local authority to regulate in matters of religious
liberty.'35 Others have argued for devolution in matters of constitutional
rights more generally. 116
The federalism effect in free speech cases casts in bold relief some dan-
gers of devolution, especially in matters of fundamental rights. To the extent
that federal speech laws are a higher quality product than state and local
speech laws, we ought to be wary of giving state and local governments
more leeway to burden fundamental rights.
The justifications for devolution emphasize three arguments. First, devo-
lution is thought to enhance democratic self-governance by making elected
officials more responsive to the voters.'37 By placing authority in the hands
132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
133. See NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
134. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (arguing against incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
135. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006)
(analyzing how federalism might impact religious liberty); Schragger, supra note 39 (arguing for
more'deference to local governmental actors on religious issues).
136. Maltz, supra note 18, at 189.
137. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 45, at 316-23; McConnell, supra note 52, at 1493-
1511; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183
(1977). For a judicial invocation, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991).
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of government officials closer to local communities-rather than in a distant
Washington, D.C.-those communities are better able to effectuate policies
and control their destinies. 13 Yet, in light of the poor track record of state
and local governments in the area of free speech, one might reasonably
question whether enhancing governmental responsiveness to relatively
small, geographically compact communities is such a good thing. As Madi-
son warned, in smaller jurisdictions there are fewer interests competing
against one another and local prejudices can more easily dictate legal out-
comes. 3 9 When small, cohesive groups in the electorate control lawmaking,
oppression of outsiders and minorities becomes easier. At the federal level,
the pressures of competing interest groups make such oppression more diffi-
cult to achieve.
Modem-day public-choice theory tells us that elected officials are not
simply public spirited; they respond to incentives. 40 Owing to structural
features of the national government, these lawmakers are less likely than
state and local officials to adopt poorly formed laws that exceed constitu-
tional limits. Democratic self-government loses much of its appeal when it
is employed to deny fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech, to
minority interests. One might even conclude that only by vigorous protec-
tion of speech rights-an essential element of self-government--can
governmental processes be sufficiently worthy of our respect.1
4
1
A second and related justification for devolution focuses on the "check-
ing" effect of state and local governmental authority. Under this view, a
major threat to individual liberty is concentrated governmental power in the
federal government. 42 There is a "danger of irresponsible power at the fed-
eral level in the interplay between federal bureaucracies, congressional
committees, and interest groups.' 43 While the fear of concentrated power is
legitimate, the free speech cases suggest there ought to be equal or greater
concern for decentralized power. Because of structural features of lawmak-
ing at the federal level, the legal output of the national government is the
result of a process in which multiple groups exercise their voice. Conse-
quently, that output tends to be moderate rather than radical, constitutionally
strong rather than constitutionally weak. As we descend to the state and lo-
cal level, governmental power is more easily exercised to injure the freedom
of speech.
If the First Amendment exists to keep open the channels of communica-
tion, especially for minorities, then the free speech cases suggest that state
and local regulation often needs the correcting force of federal judicial re-
138. See Stewart, supra note 44, at 924-25.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
141. This is, of course, the classic argument for judicial review articulated by John Hart Ely.
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
142. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
143. Stewart, supra note 44, at 918.
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view. Indeed, the history of individual rights in the twentieth century, espe-
cially the battle against race discrimination, indicates that state and local
authority may be "the problem, not the solution."'" If anything, the free
speech data suggest that the federal government-in the guise of the judici-
ary-is checking the excesses of state and local governments.
One might nevertheless defend the qualitatively poor output of state and
local governments if it is part of an effort to change existing doctrine. If they
object to current doctrinal rules, one of the few ways they have of attempt-
ing to change them is to enact contradictory laws and try to defend them
successfully in court. While I am skeptical that most, if any, of the poor-
quality free speech laws found in this study are conscientious efforts to
change constitutional doctrine, if they were, then we might say that law-
makers are using their legislative authority to check the federal courts.
Unfortunately for them, the federal courts have the last say.
The third argument for devolution is that it creates choice in the market-
place for governmental services and organizations.14' Here, devolution is
valued for reasons akin to those used by Justice Harlan to justify relatively
lenient judicial treatment of state obscenity laws: federal regulation ho-
mogenizes the law by requiring uniformity throughout the nation. To the
extent our pluralistic society wishes more diversity, diminished federal
power and augmented state and local authority may serve to create variation
in legal regimes. People can then choose to move to the area that most re-
sembles their preferences. 46 In one sense, the free speech cases support the
premises of this argument: at lower levels of government, there is a range of
unusual speech regimes that mobile citizens could choose from. People op-
posed to campaign-finance reform or to speech about violence can find
jurisdictions with laws that match their desires.
The problem is that choice and diversity are not necessarily values that
should be encouraged when it comes to fundamental rights. 47 The right to
free speech is supposed to be enjoyed equally by all citizens, regardless of
their place of residence. In the traditional understanding of the First
Amendment, the citizen choice that is valued is that which comes from un-
fettered debate in the marketplace of ideas. If state and local governments
can restrict speech, the channels of dialogue are restricted and choice dimin-
ished, not enhanced.
144. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 50-57 (1995). As Barry Friedman
notes, "the states seem to have been hard at work earning a reputation that they are hostile to civil
liberty and favor parochial interests." Friedman, supra note 19, at 367.
145. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Stewart, supra note 44, at 923-27.
146. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
147. See Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience
of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 151 (1989).
148. The classic statement, of course, belongs to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ...."); Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. I.
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A proponent of devolution might nonetheless see in the free speech cas-
es a cause for concern: the courts consistently invalidate local speech laws
and usually reject state speech laws. Federal power is thus exercised to di-
minish state and local regulatory authority. If the variation in survival rates
is due exclusively to judicial deference to federal lawmakers and hostility to
state and local lawmakers, then the concern is well founded. Yet in light of
the evidence that the quality of legislation in the free speech area is also
likely a factor, then we should fear state and local authority being exercised
in disregard of constitutional doctrine and in an oppressive manner. State
and local governments either do not care enough about the constitutional
quality of their lawmaking or receive insufficient legal counsel in formulat-
ing (and defending) policy. In either case, the trouble for devolution is the
same: state and local governments do not adequately protect fundamental
rights.
B. Tailoring Rights
In recent years, a growing literature has developed around the idea of
"tailoring" rights along institutional lines. The main idea is that rights
should not apply identically to all governmental actors.149 In contrast to tra-
ditional constitutional doctrine, according to which constitutional principles
impose the same obligations on all governmental actors,150 proponents of
tailoring argue that courts should be much more sensitive to the unique con-
texts and missions of different governmental actors. Such tailoring can
happen vertically with courts treating the federal government differently
than state or local governments. Or it can happen horizontally, with courts
treating different governmental actors at the same level of government (such
as educational institutions or prisons) in distinct ways." 2 Perhaps the most
notable arguments for such tailoring have come from two Supreme Court
opinions authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Grutter v. Bollinger'53
149. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 135, at 105; Rosen, Context, supra note 18; Mark D.
Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Tailoring]; Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles]; Schauer, Institutional
First Amendment, supra note 4.
150. The lack of formal "tailoring" of the speech right along federalism lines is not rare in
American constitutional law. The Supreme Court has insisted that the equal-protection principle
applies in a consistent, congruent manner as between the state and federal governments. See Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). In addition to affirmative action under
equal protection, the Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff specifically rejected the
idea that state governments should be allowed more leeway than the federal government under the
Fifth Amendment's takings clause. See 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The identity of the governmental actor
was "irrelevant," the Court wrote, as the states were equally as "capable as Congress" in making
determinations of what counts as a public use. Id. at 244.
151. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 135, at 20; Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 149, at 1515.
152. See Schauer, Principles, supra note 149, at 86.
153. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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and Johnson v. California.5 4 In Grutter, O'Connor wrote that law-school
affirmative action policies were due "a degree of deference" despite the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny because the "complex educational judgments"
involved lay "primarily within the expertise of the university."'55 Thanks to
this deferential strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the use of race in law-school
admissions. In Johnson, O'Connor wrote that race-based prison policies
may nonetheless survive strict scrutiny because "[p]risons are dangerous
places, and the special circumstances they present may justify racial classi-
fications." 1
56
The free speech data shed important light on the recent turn to rights tai-
loring in two ways. First, the cases suggest that vertical tailoring of rights
may already be occurring even when courts formally reject such an ap-
proach, as they have in the context of the First Amendment. On the one
hand, courts may employ some degree of sliding-scale deference in free
speech cases and thus are willing to uphold laws adopted by one level of
government (federal) while subjecting the laws of other levels (state and
local) to greater scrutiny. If such deference does account for some of the
federalism effect in speech cases, then an informal type of tailoring is hap-
pening already in the federal courts. Such an approach, however, ought to be
openly admitted and justified by the courts. Judicial honesty and forthright-
ness are particularly important values in constitutional adjudication, where
the will of popular majorities is being overturned. A doctrine built on formal
equality but operating on the basis of informal tailoring undermines the le-
gitimacy of judicial review. To this extent, Grutter and Johnson can be
admired because at least they are overt about the Supreme Court's tailoring
of the equal-protection principle.
Even in the absence of any distinct judicial treatment of laws adopted by
different governmental actors, tailoring may nevertheless occur on the sup-
ply side: different governmental actors vary in their lawmaking in
constitutionally important ways. Tailoring, in other words, may be some-
thing that legislatures and executive agencies do. So the right of free speech
is going to take on a different shape depending on the governmental actors
that adopt regulations. If, for example, only the federal government were to
regulate speech, we might find that speech gains protection from the moder-
ating interest-group pressures that work at that level of government. If other
institutions, who lack similar pressures, adopt speech regulations, then the
right will be effectively different-at least until the courts step in. And that
latter step is never certain; one imagines that there are ample numbers of
speech restrictions in place that are never challenged because those affected
154. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). Outside of the equal-protection context, the federal courts have
tailored constitutional principles to the prison context by adopting a formally lenient standard of
review, even where stricter scrutiny would ordinarily apply outside of prisons, see Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
155. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
156. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515.
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do not feel harmed sufficiently to justify bringing suit or simply cannot af-
ford to mount a challenge.
This latter point leads me to the second way in which the free speech da-
ta cast new light on the tailoring-of-rights debate. It may be that the
movement toward tailoring is occurring for the wrong reasons and with un-
desirable consequences. In Grutter, the Court argues for granting
universities some measure of leeway under the equal-protection principle
because of their "educational mission" and academic "expertise."'' 7 In John-
son-and the related, earlier decision of Turner v. Safley, which held that
deferential scrutiny generally applies to prison regulations burdening some
constitutional rights of prisoners1-it is prison officials' objective of main-
taining discipline and "prison safety" that leads to judicial respect for their
policies.' Yet, while courts might be justified in considering the unique
contexts of different lawmakers, the emphasis on institutional mission ob-
scures the lawmaking dynamics that lead governmental actors to adopt
constitutionally strong or weak laws. If one believes that interest-group
pressures tend to moderate lawmaking, then one might want to grant leeway
instead to those governmental actors whose legal output is subject to such
competition.
Consider the university context involved in Grutter. Even if a university
has an institutional mission to expose students to multiple perspectives and to
prepare tomorrow's leaders, university policies are not likely to have been
vetted by numerous competing, well-informed interest groups. As bureau-
cratic entities, universities (even public ones) will tend to be governed
authoritatively from those at the top of the relevant hierarchy-administrators
with relatively little accountability and thus unlikely to be influenced by
voices outside the university. Thus, one might expect that universities and
other educational institutions will often adopt laws that stray from existing
constitutional standards. Indeed, there were nineteen university policies and
other educational institutions' rules within the free speech data and each one
was declared constitutionally impermissible. At least with regard to core
speech rights, educators have not proven to be worthy of any degree of defer-
ence.
A similar story might be told about prisons: their policies are not the
product of interest-group competition but are bureaucratically ordained from
prison administration. Not only are prison officials unlikely to feel the
forces of moderation, their understandable desire for order and discipline
might have the effect of overwhelming competing constitutional concerns
for prisoners' rights. The unique prison context may be more reason-not
less-to distrust even the most well-meaning and conscientious prison offi-
cials.
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Free Speech Federalism
With both educational institutions and prisons, the political safeguards
that come from an institutional context in which oppression is minimized
and moderation encouraged are conspicuously absent. Institutional mission,
expertise, or the hazardous environments in which those governmental ac-
tors operate are the wrong elements on which to base a determination to
defer in matters of fundamental rights. Those factors are easily met by any
number of governmental actors. Environmental agencies, health agencies,
transportation agencies, and police and fire departments all have defined
institutional missions, possess a degree of expertise in achieving those ob-
jectives, and operate in difficult environments with important consequences
for the public good. Whether or not these institutions deserve unusual lee-
way to regulate in ways that impinge on fundamental rights should not turn
on those common, easily satisfied criteria. If the courts are going to tailor
rights, they should focus on the institutional and structural factors that make
the legal output of a governmental entity relatively likely to satisfy existing
constitutional standards. Otherwise, the courts are welcoming the depriva-
tion of individual rights in order to protect the "rights" of governmental
actors. That calculus turns fundamental rights, which are supposed to pro-
tect individuals and limit government, on their head.
CONCLUSION
The impact of the different levels of government on free speech cases
has gone unnoticed since the mid-century demise of Justice Harlan's pro-
posal for First Amendment tailoring. Although Harlan's proposal for
disparate judicial treatment of federal and state speech restrictions was for-
mally rejected, in practice the level of government still matters to judicial
review in more or less hidden, unrecognized ways. The empirical analysis of
federal court free speech decisions offered here shows that despite the same
standard of review, there is a big difference between federal and state and
local laws. Federal speech. laws survive more than half the time, state laws
survive only a quarter of the time, and local laws almost always fail. This
free speech federalism is likely attributable to some combination of federal
courts deferring to federal lawmakers and the relative poor quality of law-
making at the lower levels of government.
The free speech cases naturally lead to the question of whether a similar
pattern might be found in other areas of constitutional law. Aside from re-
cent cases promoting the notion of rights tailoring, the federal courts usually
insist that the enacting governmental entity is not a relevant factor in consti-
tutional decisionmaking. Yet, in a separate study, I found a degree of
incongruence in federal court cases on the constitutionality of race-based
affirmative action; here, too, federal laws were more likely than state laws to
be upheld.6 ° Despite doctrinal rules to the contrary, such a result should not
be surprising. The institutional dynamics that might lead federal courts to
160. See Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirnative
Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1931 (2007).
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defer to other federal actors or that lead state and local governments to adopt
relatively oppressive laws should influence legislation more or less across
the constitutional horizon.
